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SETTING ASIDE VERDICT; INADEQUACY. A good illustrtion of the
principle that a court will set aside a verdict on the ground that the
,damages awarded by a jury are inadequate is found in the case of
Connor v. Mfayor, Etc., ofthe City ofV. Y., 5o N. Y. Suppl. 972
(April 7, 1898).
The facts in the case are as follows: Timothy Connor, deceased,
was a workman in good health, driving a cart at $2.00 per day.
One day he was thrown from his cart by an accident resulting from
a hole in the cross walk of the street two feet square and between
five and six inches deep. This unsafe condition had existed for
five or six months. Connor received injuries from the fall, from
which he died, leaving a widow and four children, the youngest
six, and the eldest eleven. The case was submitted to a jury who
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found a verdict for the plaintiff for $iooo. The trial judge setaside the verdict on the ground that it was inadequate.
The defendant appealed from that order, and the First Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York,
by a divided court sustained the decision of the judge below. The
majority of the court said that they agreed with the trial judge "that
if the defendant was liable at all, the damages sustained by the widow
and the four minor children, who will need many years of support
before they can care for themselves, exceeded the sum awarded by
the jury." They stated also that they were not disposed to interfere
with the discretion of the trial court in granting a new trial unless
it appeared that that decision was based upon an erroneous determination of a legal question or principle, or upon some misunderstanding of the evidence.
The duty to support the family is upon the husband and father
even if the widow and children had other means of support. Under
the circumstances they thought that the trial judge did not commit
legal error in his determination that the amount awarded by the
jury was inadequate.
When there is a grave doubt in the mind of the court whether or
not the jury has properly considered the evidence, and the verdict
confirms the doubt, a new trial should be granted: .Afinley v. City
of Scrantn, 4 Dist. Rep. 11 7 (1895).
Where the court sets aside the verdict in a case in which a jury
has awarded damages, either excessive or inadequate, it exercises
its sound discretion. Instances of the latter occur less frequently
because it is less frequently possible to make it appear that the jury
grossly erred in awarding too little: Hale on Damages, §§ 92, 93.
The authorities seem to concur on the principle that, when the
evidence is indefinite and uncertain in character, it is a case for the
consideration of a jury, and one where the determination of a jury
should be conclusive; and, on the other hand, the authorities seem
to be equally decisive that where the evidence is certain and definite
in character, and it is clearly evident that the jury awarded inadequate damages, it is proper to set aside the verdict and direct a new
trial.
The case of Connor v. The Mayor, Etc., seems to come within
the second class, although the decision of the court below was
affirmed by a divided court. The dissenting judges holding that
the verdict was wrongly set aside, cited Roger v. R. R. CO., 37
N. Y. Suppl. 520 (1896), to sustain their position.
An examination of the facts of this case shows that it comes
within the first class of cases which the authorities are agreed is
peculiarly for the jury. The verdict here was for the death of a
three and a-half year old girl. It was held that the verdict should
not be set aside, but the evidence was conflicting as to the defendant's negligence, of the intestate's negligence, and that of her
parents. The circumstances of the case show that it was a case
peculiarly for a jury.
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It is laid down in Roger v. R. R. Co., which might well be cited
to sustain the position taken by the majority, that the court is justified in interfering with a verdict of a jury in those cases where it
appears that the jury, in fixing the amount of the verdict, were
actuated by prejudice, passion, partiality, or corruption, orfailed
to understandand aibply the rule of damages apertainingto the case;
or where it can be clearly seen from the record that, under all the
circumstances of the case, the amount awarded was unreasonable
and unfair.

INDISTINCTION BETWEEN "RAILROADS " AND "RAILWAYS;"
TENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE. MassachusettsLoqn & T'rust Comn-

Jpany etalv. Hamilton, 88 Fed. 588 (May, 1898).

In this case the
court was called upon to interpret the meaning of the word "railway."
The Statute of Montana, under the provisions of which the
suit was brought, recited that "a judgment against any railway
corporation for any injury to person or property, or for material
furnished or labor done upon any of the property of such corporation, shall be a lien within the county where recovered, on the
property of such corporation, and such lien shall be prior and superior to the liens of any mortgage or trust deed provided for in this
The appellee, the plaintiff below, had obtained a judgment
Act."
against the Great Falls Street Railway Company for personal injuries
received, and claimed that the provision of the statute above quoted
made his judgment a lien on the property of the railway company
prior and superior to the mortgage liens of the appellants. The
court decided that the meaning of the word "railway" was to be
gathered from the intention of the legislature when the word was
used, and the general legislation on the subject matter. From a
review of the Montana Statutes treating of "railroads" and "railways" it appeared that when the Legislature used the words
only "steam railroads" were in
"railroad"
or "railway,"
contemplation; whereas, when " street railroads" or "street
railways" were to be designated the term "street" was prefixed.
The court, therefore, held that the statute relied upon by the
appellee had no present application, and refused to give priority
and superiority to his judgment lien.
This decision accords with the majority of rulings on this subject
in the United States. In Manhattan Trust Co. v. Sioux City Cable
Railway Co., 68 Fed. 82 (1895), it was held that an Iowa Statute
making a judgment against any "railway " corporation for injuries
to person or property, a lien superior to that of a mortgage on its
property, did not include "street railways," for the Legislature
meant it to have an exclusive
when it used the word "railway"
In Louisville and Portland
application to "steam railways."
Railroad Company v. Louisville City Railway, 2 Duvall (Ky.),
not to
175 (I865), the court interpreted the word "railroad"
include "street railways," because such was the apparent intention
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of the Legislature. See, also, Funk v. St. Paul City Railway,
63 N. W. nior (1895); Lax v. Forty-second and Grand Streets
Ferry Railroad Company, 46 N. Y. Superior Court, 448 (i88o).
Most text-books on railroads, in treating of the distinction between "railroads"
and "railways,"
lay down the rule that the
words are synonymous, and that no criterion exists whereby to determine in what sense they are used. It is submitted that this
statement is erroneous, and a thorough examination of the very
cases cited in support of it establishes the principle that the words
are always to be construed in the light of the legislative intent.
Thus, in the case of Hestonville, Mantua and FairmountPassenger
Railway Company v. The City of Philade hia, 89 Pa. 210 (1879),
which is cited as opposing the view adopted in the case of Massachusetts Loan and Trust Covoany v. ilamilton, it was held that the
term "railroads" included "street railways," because the context of the statute in which it was used demonstrated that such was
the intention of the Legislature. In Washington Street Asylum and
Park Railroad Company, X15 N. Y. 442 (1889), the court decided that "street railways" were embraced in the word "railroad," as used in a statute, it appearing that the Legislature had so
intended. See, also, Johnson v. Zouisville Railway Company, l o
Bush (Ky.), 231 (875).
VERDICT BEFORE JUDGMENT; ASSIGNABILITY;

EXECUTION.

In

the case of Bennett el al. v. Sweet et al., 51 N. E. 183 (Aug. 30,
1898), a verdict for personal injuries had been obtained by defendant. Before judgment was entered, plaintiff, a creditor of defendant, brought a creditor's bill to subject this verdict to the payment of his claim. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that the verdict was not property of such a nature as might be
reached by the creditor. It is obvious that the question is the
same as that presented in cases where the assignability of a verdict
is at issue-or, in other words, whether such a verdict is "prop•erty."
The weight of authority on this question rests with the
principal case.
It is generally admitted that a claim for personal injuries,
whether before or after verdict, on which judgment has not been
entered, is not assignable: Howard v. Crowther, 8 M. & W. 603
(1843) ; Rice v. Stone, i Allen, 566 (186x), (assault); Lawrence
v. Martin, 22 Cal. 173 (1863), (malicious prosecution) ; Zinton
v. iurley, 104 Mass. 353 (x870), (assault) ; Mc Glinchy v. Hull,
58 Me. 152 (1870), (personal injuries).
"Has any court of law
or equity ever sanctioned a claim by an assignee to compensation
for wouuded feelings, injured reputation or bodily pain suffered by
-an assignor? There are two principal reasons why the assignments
above mentioned are held to be invalid at common law. One was
to avoid maintenance. This reason has in modern times lost
-much, but not the whole of its force . . . . The other reason is a
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principle of law, applicable to all assignments, that they are void
unless the assignor has, actually or potentially, the thing which he
attempts to assign. A man cannot grant or charge that which he
has not:" Rice v. Stone, i Allen, 566 (1861). Applying this principle, it is clear that a defendant, even after verdict in an action of
personal tort, is not in possession of anything, either "actually or
potentially," belonging to plaintiff. Such was the result reached
in Thayer v. Southwick, 8 Gray, 229 (1857), where the creditors
of the plaintiff attempted to attach a verdict in the hands of the
defendant. "The verdict did not convert it [the claim] into a
a debt; no action of debt would lie on it. It could not constitute
a debt until judgment should be rendered on it." Per Hubbard, J.
The validity of an assignment of a verdict has not, however,.
been universally denied. In Langford v. Ellis, 14 East, 202 n.
(18o6), such an assignment was held good against a subsequent
creditor of the assignor, on the ground that "the damages were
liquidated at the moment of the verdict."
So in Zogbaum v.
Parker, 55 N. Y. 120 (1873), the assignment of a verdict for malicious prosecution was sustained as between counsel and client,
even though it was attached by a creditor the moment judgment
was obtained. It seems that equity will lend its aid to support assignments in such cases: Countryman v. Bower, 3 How. Pr.
(1848) ; Nash v. Hamilton, 3 Abb. Pr. 35 (1856).
See, also;
Ladd v. Ferguson, 9 Ore. i8o (88I) ; Gamble v. R. R., 8o Ga.
595 (1888).
The objection to such assignment, on the ground
that there is no certain sum to assign, has been held not to apply
to verdicts or claims for injuries done to property, either real orpersonal, since the claims are deemed to be in the nature of
vested interests. Thus, assignments may be made of claims for
trespass de bonis: North v. Turner, 9 S. & R. 244 (1823), forconversion of personal property; Jordan v. Gillan, 44 N. H. 424
(1862), for the right to recover a penalty for charging usurious
interest; Gray v. Bennett, 3 Metc. 522 (1842) ; Wheelock v. Lee,
64 N. Y. 243 (1876) ; or for damages suffered from locomotive
sparks: 2yler v. Ricamore, 87 Va. 466 (1891).
See 2 Am. &
Eng. Enc. of Law (2d ed.), p. 1021.

